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THE NEBRASKA CAPITAL CONTROVERSY,

1854-59

JAMES B. POTTS
cratic administrations in Washington, political
life in Nebraska between 1854 and 1859
centered around issues of economic development, including struggles over the promotion of towns and the selection of railroad
routes. From the first, problems common to
the settlement of an underdeveloped frontier
forced town promoters into politics. Inadequate transportation, in particular, impeded farm expansion and threatened to retard
the growth of towns. Since the future development of Nebraska's towns and thus of the
territory itself hinged on railroad connections,
the location of rail lines was destined to
become a major political concern. But many
Nebraska towns were speculations, pure and
simple; their survival depended on their ability
to attract a railroad, the capital, or some other
institutional guarantee of urban success. Politics invariably became the means for town
builders to influence the awarding of these
valuable prizes. Because the Platte River naturally split the territory into two sections,
townsite competition was distinctly geographic: North and South Platte boosters regularly
contended over the location of institutional
and transportation facilities that could alter
their section's prospects. One pioneer law-

Early in 1857 Mark W. Izard, in a letter to
Senator Stephen A. Douglas, summed up the
frustrations that marked his tenure as governor of Nebraska Territory. "If there is anything on earth I desire more than all others,"
he told the Illinois senator, "it is to make this
the model territory, and my faith is that if
Congress will extend her a moderate share of
liberality, the sacred doctrine of popular rights
will fully be vindicated in her example." "But,"
he continued, "the path of your humble
servant is extremely narrow and thickly set
with snares on every side."l Chief among the
"snares" that Izard spoke of was a bitter
controversy over location of the capital, an
issue that disrupted territorial politics and was
much prolonged by personal disputes, townsite
rivalries, and sectional divisions within the
territory.
Although strongly influenced by Demo-
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maker noted that there were two Nebraska
parties-North and South Platte-in that early
period.:
Sectional strife assumed its most dramatic
form in a bitter struggle over the location of
the territorial capital, which carried federal
prestige, payroll, and patronage opportunity.
Selection as the capital would all but guarantee
one location's success as a governmental and
commercial center. Capital city designation
would assure the lucky town of population
growth and a rise in the value of town lots and
result in "the expenditure of thousands of
dollars, a horde of [government] officials, [and]
the busy hum of business activity." Such status
would also ensure the arrival of the Pacific
railroad, which most town boosters expected
would pass through the territorial capital.
Given the size of the stakes involved, the site
of government was a matter of supreme
importance to local boosters.;
THE FIRST TERRITORIAL ASSEMBLY

The Nebraska Act of 1854 specified that
the territorial governor would select the meeting site for the first assembly and stipulated
that thereafter the legislature would determine
the permanent seat of government. Governor
Francis Burt, however, died shortly after his
arrival in the territory and the task of putting
the government into operation fell to the
territorial secretary, Thomas B. Cuming, who
became acting governor. Just five days after
Burt's death, Cuming ordered the taking of a
territorial census. The dispatch with which he
moved demonstrated his impatience to organize territorial affairs to his own advantage
before the appointment of a new governor.
Unlike Burt, who seemingly had no fixed
notion regarding the permanent location of
the capital, Cuming was committed to the
wishes of the Council Bluffs and Nebraska
Ferry Company, the principal proprietor of
Omaha City.4
Once clothed with executive authority,
Cuming moved quickly to organize civil government and to ensure the election of a

legislature that would permanently fix the
capital at Omaha. He divided the territory
into eight counties, four north and four south
of the Platte River. And though the census
showed nearly twice as many inhabitants
south of the river, Cuming assigned the
majority of the assembly seats to Omaha and
the northern counties. He gerrymandered
Bellevue, assigning that community to an
election district dominated by Omaha voters.
Then on 20 December 1854, after an election
called posthaste, the acting governor announced that the first legislative session would
be held at Omaha.'
The first assembly was, as J. Sterling
Morton later recalled, "a game to scramble
with 'the devil take the hind-most' for its
guiding rule." The primary object of contention was the capital. The South Platte delegation was still formidable despite the
unfavorable apportionment and came to Omaha determined to strip the city of its prize.
Bellevue, Florence, and other towns north of
the Platte also envisioned their possible selection as the site of government. Knowing that
the legislature could reverse the executive's
decision, all "realized the importance of the
session upon our own personal interests,"
noted one Omaha supporter. 6
During the legislative debates on the capital question, "dear bought popular sovereignty
seemed for a time below par," according to one
observer. "It was a bloodless war of words
between North and South of the Platte, with a
slight display of inclination to carry it at the
risk of burning powder. ,,; After weeks of bitter
debate, threats of physical violence, and much
private manipulation, five legislators (four
members of the house and one councilman)
deserted the "removalists" and voted for
Omaha. On 22 February 1855 the assembly
officially placed the capital at Omaha. s Omaha's status as capital was never secure, however. Representatives of Bellevue and the South
Platte towns generally refused to let the issue
die, and the question of whether the government should remain in Omaha dominated
legislative sessions for the next several years.
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A NEW GOVERi'.'OR ARRIVES

Governor Mark Izard arrived in Omaha on
20 February 1855, at the close of the first
legislative session. Despite scattered local criticism, the new executive was generally well
received throughout the territory. For a time it
appeared he might even bring stability to
Nebraska politics. In his first formal address to
the assembly, Izard carefully avoided divisive
local issues and called the legislature's attention to more urgent needs of the territory. He
urged the immediate passage of general election and tax laws and, as a temporary expedient, suggested the adoption in toto of the
civil and criminal law codes of Iowa. And to
the astonishment of the legislators, he offered
to surrender his powers of appointment to the
voters "in conformity with the principles of
popular rights." Finally, noting that the noble
experiment of popular sovereignty \vas on trial
in Nebraska, he cautioned the lawmakers and
the people "to rise above local jealousies and
personal animosities, and adhere to the great
principles of concession and conciliation.""
Governor Izard's political life in Nebraska
was nevertheless short and unhappy. Like
most federal officials sent to the territory, he
viewed his appointment as a means to personal
financial gain. In partnership with his son
James, who conducted a banking and real
estate business in Omaha, he engaged in
numerous land and business speculations.
Izard obtained one-twentieth part ownership
of the capital city and acquired interests in
other important county sites north of the
Platte. He eventually identified his interests
with those of Enos Lowe, Jesse Williams, and
other members of the Omaha and Council
Bluffs business community. lc' Once his proOmaha sympathies became apparent, the
removalists began to oppose his administration
and to work for his dismissal, denouncing him
as "the mere agent or tool" of Iowa speculators-"the Governor of Council Bluffs and
Omaha City Ferry Company.""
Factionalism continued to plague Nebraska
politics despite Izard's plea for "concessions
and conciliation." Indeed, the settlement of

the capital question in favor of Omaha by the
first legislature intensified sectional hostilities.
No sooner had the new executive arrived and
the assembly adjourned than the territorial
residents began to direct their attention to the
election of the second assembly and a new
delegate to Congress.
A DELEGATE TO CONGRESS

The two principal contenders for the
delegate post were Hiram P. Bennett, a youthful Nebraska City lawyer, and Bird B. Chapman, a political adventurer who tied his
ambitions to Omaha. Chapman, a classic
example of the pre-Civil War carpetbagger,
quit a minor Washington clerkship in 1854
and went to Nebraska to run for Congress. He
failed to secure election, and having taken the
precaution of establishing his own news organ,
the Omaha Nebraskian, he went back East to
await the next canvass. Returning to the
territory in 1855, some weeks before the
election, he organized the Omaha townsite
promoters and most of the federal officials,
including Izard and Cuming, into a temporary
alliance to back his candidacy for the delegate
seatY
Hiram Bennett was the hand-picked candidate of the Nebraska City Town Site Company. A native of Maine, Bennett had come west
by way of Ohio, Missouri, and Iowa. In 1854
he migrated to Nebraska City from Sidney,
Iowa, at the urging of his friend and subsequent business partner, Stephen F. Nuckolls.
A South Platte townsite booster and an ardent
removalist, Bennett had the general support of
the southern counties and of anti-Omaha
elements around Bellevue and Florence. A
third candidate, John Thayer, a New Englander who had migrated to Omaha from
Massachusetts in 1854, ran on an independent
platform and eschewed sectionalism as detrimental to the development of the territory. Il
The campaign revolved around local economic and personality issues. Party lines were
nonexistent, though labels like "Border
Roughian" and "Know Nothing" were occasionally attached to Thayer and Bennett by
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the Chapman press. Mostly it was a North
Platte versus South Platte affair-those advocating capital relocation and reapportionment
versus those supporting the status quo. Thus,
Chapman's supporters ignored Thayer and
concentrated their attacks on Bennett and the
Nuckolls-Nebraska City gang while the latter
denounced Chapman and his federal allies as
nonresident speculators. Both sides were liberal in promises of reward, holding out land
offices and other federal favors to "every onehorse town in the territory. "I'
Plural voting, vote buying, ballot box
stuffing, and other irregularities were common
in the election of 1855. In November, Nebraska voters-and some voters from Iowa and
Missouri-went to the polls. The territorial
board of canvassers found considerable evidence of fraud on both sides. Had all the votes
been accepted as valid, Bennett would have
received a majority of thirteen. But the advantage rested with Chapman, who commanded
the support of the federal officials. The proChapman canvassers rejected the votes of four
counties, three of which recorded Bennett
majorities. By the final count, Chapman was
awarded a majority of 113 and certified the
winner. I;
Bitter charges of fraud and bribery flew
between the two candidates when the results
were posted. Bennett immediately announced
his intention of contesting Chapman's seat
and proceeded to gather evidence of fraud and
illegal voting while Chapman did the same.
The dispute, ultimately settled in favor of
Chapman, was the first of a series of contested
elections that lasted until 1862. During much
of the period between 1855 and 1862, Nebraska was denied effective representation in
Congress. Candidates openly announced their
intent to contest results-should they losebefore votes were even cast. The situation led
critics to suggest that candidates entered the
delegate race to secure a paid trip to Washington. A local editor noted the unfortunate
result of these contests on territorial patronage. "One great reason why so little has
heretofore been secured for Nebraska," he
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wrote, "is that she has never yet had a delegate
so situated that he could work for the territory; he has always devoted the most of his time
to watching and defending his seat.""
REMOVIl"G THE CAPIT AL FRO~1 OMAHA

The bitterness engendered by the delegate
contest carried over into the assembly session
of 1856, described by one observer as "one
continued personal and local fight, a constant
attempt at bargain, sale, and argument."l; The
anti-Omaha forces returned to the assembly
determined to undo the capital location of the
previous session. But while the removalists
comprised a slim majority and controlled the
organization of the lower house, the administration group was able to divide and conquer
their factious opponents. Though unable to
remove the capital, they did succeed in trimming Omaha's representation in the assembly
by placing Bellevue in a separate election
district. They also passed a bill authorizing a
new legislative apportionment, and in an
action aimed at Chapman, enacted a one-year
residency requirement for delegate candidates. le
By the end of 1855 it was obvious that
Omaha would never permit an outright removal bill to pass the assembly. The removalists also realized that the capital aspirations of
the larger Missouri River towns precluded
relocation to an established point, and so the
leaders determined to move the seat of government to the interior. This plan won the
general approval of those urban boosters, on
both sides of the Platte, who sought to humble
Omaha. It also converted residents of settlements in central Nebraska and local speculators to the support of capital removal.
The removalists first attempted this ploy in
January 1856, at the tag end of the second
assembly session, with a bill locating the seat of
government at Chester, a paper town "somewhere on Salt Creek." The plan almost
succeeded, but at the last minute three South
Platte members joined the Omaha forces to
defeat the measure. I')
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The removalist leaders then determined to
move the seat of government to another
interior location. Sometime during the summer of 1856 a group headed by Stephen F.
Nuckolls and E. W. McComas, a Virginian
interested in Nebraska lands, drafted a bill for
the third legislature that would authorize the
placement of the territorial capital at Douglas
City-a site they controlled. Meanwhile, to
smooth the way the Douglas promoters divided the townsite into shares which were subsequently distributed freely among the members
of the assembly.20
By the winter of 1856-57 the removalists'
prospects seemed bright. Until then, most of
the northern county representatives had been
either residents of Omaha and Council Bluffs
or friends and agents of Secretary Cuming.
During the first session Omaha and its allies
had controlled slightly more than half the
seats in the assembly. But by the end of 1856
the situation had radically changed. The
addition of six new counties, the creation of an
independent Bellevue district (with one councilman and four representatives), and the
enactment of a new apportionment that
increased legislative membership by thirteen
had caused a marked reduction in Omaha's
voting power. Moreover, lesser North Platte
counties had grown more independent and
had begun to challenge Omaha's control over
territorial politics. 21
By the third assembly in January 1857, the
Omaha partisans had been reduced to a
minority faction in the legislature, and the
removalists appeared to have the upper hand.
They controlled twenty-five out of thirty-five
seats in the lower house and nine out of a
possible thirteen in the council, along with the
presiding officers of both houses. 22 Feeling that
the moment of success was upon them, they
set out to remove the seat of government from
Omaha. The Omaha faction, led by the
formidable Andrew Jackson Hanscom and
backed by a friendly lobby, determined to
retain the capital at all costs.
When the legislators considered the relocation bill, excitement ran high and normal

parliamentary procedure collapsed at times.
On one occasion the speaker, Isaac Gibbs,
ordered Hanscom arrested, whereupon
Hanscom and his friends made things so warm
for Gibbs "that he dared not occupy the
chair." The anti-Omaha members requested
the governor to station militiamen in the
assembly to protect them from the "factious
opposition of the minority and the riotous ...
mob of persons thronging the lobby." Despite
every effort to prevent passage, the removalists
pushed through a motion creating a committee
of three to consider relocating the capital. Two
days later, the committee reported favorably
and the lawmakers, "their pockets lined with
scrip," voted to move the government to
DouglasY
OMAHA FIGHTS BACK

While the removalist press joyfully boasted
that "the ship sinketh," Omaha backers were
not dismayed. 24 As expected, Governor Izard
vetoed the measure as a direct contradiction of
the Organic Act. Congress, he insisted, had
never intended removal once federal funds had
been appropriated and expended for the
construction of a capitol. Pointing to the
central location of Omaha-"immediately opposite the great gateway into the territory"-he
moreover challenged the necessity and motive
for moving the capital to "a floating town, not
only without a location, but without inhabitants."25
Meanwhile, the Omaha faction secured
new allies in the assembly. Through the
expenditure of $3000 and the promise of the
territorial government printing contract, they
won over two members who had previously
voted for removal, Robert W. Furnas and
Albert Finney. The desertion of Furnas in the
council left the removalists without the twothirds vote necessary to override the governor's veto, and thus the bill was indefinitely
postponed. "The treachery of Furnas . . . left
us without a two-thirds vote and we could do
nothing to get him back," lamented Gibbs.
"He has grasped the entire interest of the
territory and direct interests oi the South
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Platte in his avaricious hand and hauled us
down.""
Resentment against Governor Izard grew
during the early months of 1857. Though the
governor previously had attracted occasional
criticism, Izard's pro-Omaha stance in the
capital affair, coupled with his opposition to
several banking measures approved by the
assembly, unleashed a wave of local discontent
that resulted in his dismissal. In January 1857
the governor complained to Stephen Douglas
that "a miserable batch of hungry office
seekers ... have since the election come down
upon us like an avalanche." "They are at this
time straining every nerve to sow the seeds of
discord among the people by taking advantage
of the petty jealousies ... between the different sections of the Territory, with a view to
effect the [removal of] present Federal Officers."';
REMOVING THE GOVERNOR

By 1857 the elimination of the Izard-Cuming clique had become the primary aim of the
anti-Omaha faction. Embittered by the governor's recent activities and encouraged by the
inauguration of a new national administration, Izard's adversaries took the offensive with
the close of the third legislative session.
Immediately upon adjournment, a delegation
of lawmakers hastened to Washington with a
petition urging Izard's removal, signed by
twenty-three of the thirty-five members of the
assembly. Other protests forwarded to the
State Department charged him with incompetence, bribery, extortion, abuse of the veto
power, and fraudulent expenditure of federal
funds. Meanwhile, the anti-Izard press embarked upon its own local crusade against the
governor. "We want a man who will be
governor of the whole territory," exclaimed
the Florence Courier, "not one like Mark W.
Izard who will stick himself down in Omaha
and confine himself to its limits ... idling
away his time in the mere animal enjoyments
of eating, drinking, and sleeping to the manifest neglect of the interests of those over who
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[sic] he has been sent to preside.""
Isaac L. Gibbs, a member of the legislative
delegation that had journeyed to Washington,
informed the Secretary of Interior that Izard
was "unfit to govern." He charged that the
governor had held up the incorporation of six
territorial banks, offering to approve them "if
the legislature would endorse him and recommend his retention in office." Opponents also
charged that he had acted improperly in the
awarding of contracts for the construction of
the territorial capitol, even to the extent that
he was, in fact, the principal contractor. N
By the spring of 1857 the governor's
situation had deteriorated markedly and his
removal appeared certain. In March, Izard
hastened to Washington to mend his political
fences and, with some difficulty, managed to
retain his office. Although Buchanan had
appointed William Richardson in his stead,
the latter declined the post and Izard was
temporarily reinstated with the understanding
that he would submit his resignation effective
1 October 1857.
In July, George L. Miller, a youthful
Omaha politico, surveyed the political and
economic condition of the territory. He lamented that "the signs of the times are
ominous of coming storms," a forecast confirmed by subsequent events. Feuding kept the
territory in a state of agitation throughout the
summer and fall, a condition that coincided
with the sudden decline of Nebraska's economy in September 1857.!l
REPLACING THE
CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATE

Five candidates announced for the delegates hip in 1857. The forces opposing Omaha
undertook to win territory-wide support for
the replacement of Chapman as delegate.
Under the guise of a "squatter convention,"
the anti-Omaha forces met at Bellevue in July
and nominated Fenner Ferguson, chief justice
of the territorial supreme court and a resident
of Bellevue. Ferguson ran on a platform
advocating equal rights for all portions of the
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territory, liberal federal appropriations, and
"the sovereign right of people to remove the
capital. 'lie
Meanwhile, the Izard-Omaha group had
become disenchanted with Delegate Chapman, who had not only failed to tap the
congressional pork barrel but had diverted the
territorial patronage to nonresident friends
and relatives. The administration supported
instead the candidacy of Attorney General
Experience Estabrook. Although identified
with the capital city, Estabrook tried to
broaden his appeal by supporting federal aid
for the trans-Nebraska railroad, a bridge over
the Platte, a north-south military road, and
completion of the territorial capitol. ii
Still another faction, backed by Robert W.
Furnas and the Nebraska Advertiser, supported
Benjamin P. Rankin, a banker-speculator and
former territorial marshall. Although hailed
by the Advertiser as "the best man for South
Platte interests," Rankin ran on a platform
aimed at reaching all portions of the population." John Thayer of Omaha was a fourth
contender.
Delegate Chapman was not without power,
even though the governor and the Omaha
Ferry Company crowd had deserted him. He
chafed under the "horrible" treatment he had
received from Izard and his friends and was
determined to "beat them all."'; Chapman
aligned himself with Secretary Cuming and
other disaffected territorial appointees. Meanwhile, he had been scheming to eliminate his
opponents within the federal cadre and in
particular to have Izard replaced by Chapman's friend and political ally, Augustus C.
Hall. In the late summer he returned to the
territory and announced his intention to run
for re-election. Ever a gambler, he determined
to force the capital city partisans to unite
behind his candidacy or face defeat. This
calculated "rule or ruin" strategy was only
partially successful. Estabrook subsequentl'!
withdrew from the race, but the bitterness
engendered by Chapman's activities destroyed
unity within the Omaha ranks. The Omaha
Times continued its onslaughts on "Bought B.

Chapman," while former Estabrook supporters scattered behind other contenders. i,'
In an extremely close election Ferguson
won with 1654 votes to Chapman's 1597. The
two remaining candidates, Rankin and Thayer, polled 2594 ballots between them, including 711 of Omaha's 1529 votes. The inclusion
of Rankin and Thayer in the contest, combined with Chapman's poor showing of 27
percent in Omaha, were important factors in
his defeat. More decisive, however, was the
influence of Governor Izard and the territorial
board of canvassers. Despite evidence of
fraudulent voting and padded returns, the
canvassers upheld the original vote. Izard
assumed the novel position that the sole duty
of the canvassers was to tally the votes and
certify the winner. With all the votes counted
as valid, Ferguson was declared the winner by
a majority of fifty-seven. Chapman contested
the results, but Congress eventually recognized
Ferguson as the legally elected delegate. J;
OMAHA IS OUTVOTED

The anti-Omaha group not only secured
the defeat of Chapman in 1857, but they also
elected a majority of the members of the
legislature. From the beginning of the session it
was clear that a large number of the lawmakers
were in favor of moving the government from
Omaha. The capital city solons negotiated
with various local representatives to leave the
capital where it was, promising to support
various local franchise bills in return. For a
time their logrolling tactics were productive,
but toward the end of the session an incident
occurred that resulted in the eventual disruption of the assembly. Early in January the
lawmakers discovered that Omaha had never
officially relinquished title to "capital square"
and had even pledged the capital buildings and
grounds, along with other city properties, as
surety on a local scrip issue. The excitement
caused by these disclosures played into the
hands of the removalists, who immediately
introduced a new bill to relocate the seat of
government.
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The Omahans intended to block removal
and they were prepared to employ desperate
means. According to the testimony of one
South Platte member, Omaha partisans swore
that "unless the [capital) bill be withdrawn,
not another act of any kind would pass during
the session." On 7 January, the day after the
relocation measure was proposed, the capital
city solons managed (by a bit of parliamentary
legerdemain) to control the lower house and
began to filibuster. A violent row ensued,
during which an Omaha backer leaped from
the gallery onto the assembly floor and
grabbed the speaker "by the back of his neck
and the seat of his trousers [and) laid him with
great force under the speaker's table." Only
with difficulty and "in the midst of uproar and
confusion, the brandishing of dirks and threats
of shooting" was adjournment effected. '9
The following day, 8 January, the antiOmaha members left the capital and reassembled at Florence. The seceders, who retained a majority in both houses, then passed a
measure creating a capital removal commission
which was to select a site, to be called
Neapolis, at a point fifty miles west of the
Missouri and within six miles of either side of
the Platte. They also set off Florence as a
separate election district in Douglas County in
an attempt further to reduce Omaha's legislative strength. In the meantime the minority,
backed by Acting Governor Cuming and
controlling the official records, continued to
hold sessions in Omaha.'"
The new governor, William D. Richardson,
reached Omaha on 10 January determined to
curtail the endless factionalism which his
predecessor had bequeathed him. He indicated
his impartiality in the Florence affair by
seeking the legal opinion of the territorial
supreme court as to which legislature was
competent to sit. After consulting with the
justices he refused to acknowledge the Florence seceders, declaring that Omaha would
continue as the seat of government until "some
other place is fixed upon by the joint action of
the Governor and the Legislative Assembly."
He urged the rump members to return to the
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capital, guaranteeing them ample military
protection. The bolters, however, had "determined upon a different course" and consequently refused."

A TTEMPTINC;

TO SPLIT THE STATE

The fourth legislature accomplished little
in the way of lawmaking, but it did awaken
separatist interest in the South Platte region.
Disillusioned by the course of political events,
the editor of the Nebraska City News commented on the Florence fiasco of 1857-58: "We
see in it the cheering sign that Nebraska is to
be politically dismembered; we see in it another overwhelming argument ... in favor of the
speedy, peaceful separation of South Platte,
Nebraska from North Platte.':
By mid-1858 a serious movement to attach
the South Platte to Kansas was proceeding
apace. Annexation occupied the public mind
"almost to the exclusion of everything else."4l
Spearheaded by Nebraska City, which sought
the location of the Kansas capital "somewhere
in that latitude," South Platte separatists
designed a series of petitions, resolutions, and
mass meetings that placed the South Platte on
record as being united behind the annexation
movement. At a convention called at Brownville on 29 January 1858, a petition was passed
urging that southern Nebraska "be embraced
within the boundaries of the proposed State of
Kansas," and a committee of three was appointed to present the annexationists' case
before Congress. At a subsequent meeting at
Nebraska City, separatist leaders invited the
people of the region to select delegates to
represent South Platte at the forthcoming
Kansas Constitutional Convention at Wyandotte."
In Washington, the annexationists gained
the support of Senator James Green, Representative James Craig of Missouri, and others
"occupying prominent positions" who viewed
annexation as "the means of settling the vexed
Kansas question."" Kansas Democrats, who
apparently believed that the addition of southern Nebraska would ensure Democratic con-
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trol in Kansas, also backed the movement. At
the request of Governor Samuel Medary, the
Kansas legislatures of 1858 and 1859 enacted
resolutions asking Congress to extend Kansas'
northern boundary to the Platte River. The
Kansas governor, meanwhile, was quietly
urging the Nebraska separatists to elect delegates to represent their cause at Wyandotte."
While the annexationists enjoyed the support of many Kansas Democrats and South
Platte residents, the separatist movement faced
numerous obstacles. Factionalism within the
old sectional coalition undermined the
movement from the beginning. Several South
Platte leaders, including J. Sterling Morton,
deserted the separatists. Traditional allies to
the north at Bellevue and Florence also
opposed separation. Moreover, the introduction of party politics in the territory in
1858-59, which resulted in the election of a
South Platte delegate, weakened old sectional
and factional alignments. The project also
encountered strong opposition in Kansas from
Republican leaders and from south Kansas
townsite boomers who viewed the extension of
the northern boundary as a threat to their
own capital aspirations. Finally, the anti-administration majority in Congress was generally unsympathetic to the plan. Several
annexation bills were introduced in Congress,
but none passed either house. In July 1859 the
final blow was delivered by the Kansas Constitutional Convention at Wyandotte, which
emphatically rejected the schemeY
LINCOLN

Ironically, sectional partisanship began to
recede at the same time physical separation
was being promoted as a solution. The issues
continued to be familiar ones concerning
material progress and development, but after
"the Florence secession" the capital question
ceased to dominate Nebraska politics. After
1858, in fact, political competition was rechanneled along national party lines and was
increasingly influenced by issues of national
politics. Especially during the 1860s, Civil

War-related issues, including a heated partisan
debate over Nebraska statehood, predominated over more purely local concerns like
capital relocation. The capital issue was,
however, revived by statehood. In 1867 the
first regular session of the state legislature
authorized the creation of a new state capital,
and in 1868 the permanent seat of government-along with the state penitentiary and
university-was established south of the Platte
at the yet undeveloped city of Lincoln where it
remains today. Even then the troublesome
perennial question of where the capitol should
be did not die: removalists made several
attempts during the 1870s to move the government again, and although they failed, the
merits of capital relocation continued to be
debated in Nebraska political circles into the
twentieth century.48
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